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Abstract
This paper investigates the optimal implementation schedule of the measures listed in a Marginal Abatement
Cost Curves (MACC). Costs and abating potentials of each measure, provided by a MACC, are completed
with a maximum implementation speed. We ﬁnd that, when coping with a carbon budget, it makes sense
to implement some expensive options before exhausting the abating potential of the cheapest options. With
abatement targets expressed in terms of emissions at one point in time, e.g. reducing emissions by 20% in
2020 and by 75% in 2050 it can be preferable to start with the most expensive options if their potential is
higher and their inertia is great. The best strategy to reach a short-term target depends on whether this
target is the ultimate objective or there is a longer-term target. Using just the cheapest options to reach the
2020 target may create a carbon-intensive lock-in and make the 2050 target unreachable. Results suggest
that a unique carbon price in all sectors may not be the most eﬃcient approach. Additional sectoral policies,
such as the 20% renewable energy target in Europe, may be part of an eﬃcient mitigation policy.
Highlights
 MACCs are not abatement supply curves: listed activities may take decades to implement. Extending MAC curves with inertia changes the optimal order of abatement options. Reaching short-term targets with cheap options may cause carbon-intensive lock-in. Using expensive but high-inertia options in the short term may be optimal. A carbon price could usefully be combined with complementary sector- or technology-speciﬁc policies.
Keywords: optimal timing; inertia; sectoral policies; dynamic eﬃciency
1. Introduction
To design the best policies to cope with climate change, decision-makers need information about the
options for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Such information has been provided to the public in
many ways, including through Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves. We call measure-explicit MACCs
the curves that represent information on abatement costs and potentials for a set of mitigation measures
(here, we simply refer to them as MAC curves or MACCs).1 These MACCs are usually constructed for a
speciﬁc country or region, and for a speciﬁc time horizon. They report abatement potentials that can be
achieved as a function of the abatement cost, ranking potential mitigation options from the least to the most
expensive (Fig. 1).
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: vogt@centre-cired.fr (Adrien Vogt-Schilb ), shallegatte@worldbank.org (Stéphane Hallegatte)
1 Measures include changing technologies, notably in the transport and power sectors, but also non-technological options
such as modal shift in the transportation, waste recycling, reforestation and building retroﬁtting . The term MAC curve
refers in the literature to various curves, including continuous curves that do not distinguish explicitly each option as those
studied by Klepper and Peterson (2006).
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Figure 1: A measure-explicit MAC curve exhibits abatements options 1..N characterized by their maximum poten-
tial amax and their abatement cost c, ranked from the least to the most expensive. This curves stands for a given
date in the future T. We ﬁnd, maybe counter-intuitively, that the optimal mitigation strategy to reach a short-term
target X is not to implement exclusively the measures cheaper than Y.
In this paper, we investigate which options from a MACC should be used to achieve a given abatement
target, and in which order these options should be implemented. To do this, we complete the information
on costs and potential from a MACC with information on the implementation speed of each measure. This
maximum implementation speed makes it possible to distinguish available abatement measures not only
using their costs and potentials, but also the time it takes to implement them. For instance, it accounts
for the fact that urban planning may be cheaper and may have a higher potential to reduce emissions than
technological change in the car industry, but is also much slower and requires much more anticipation to
be eﬀective (Gusdorf et al., 2008). We then use an inter-temporal optimization model to investigate the
optimal timing for abatement of GHG emissions (choice across time) along with the optimal dispatch of the
reduction burden (choice across abatement measures).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a review of the literature on the MACCs
methodology and limits. In Section 3, we present our model. Then, we use it in Section 4 with an objective
in terms of cumulative emissions over a long period, a so-called carbon budget, which is reportedly a good
proxy for climate change. We ﬁnd that it makes sense to implement the more expensive options before
exhausting the whole potential of the cheapest options. Also, it may be optimal to use expensive options
even when cheap ones are suﬃcient to reach the abatement target, in order to delay action and save present
value. We then turn to objectives expressed in terms of aggregate abatement at one point in time, closer
to the actual practices. In that case, we ﬁnd that it can be preferable to start by implementing the most
expensive options, if their potential is large and their inertia is great (Section 5.1). An other counterintuitive
result is that MACCs should not be used as supply curves when choosing the optimal strategy to achieve
short-term emission targets, as the optimal short-term strategy actually depends on the long-term emission
objective (Section 5.2). We conclude in section 6.
2. Literature on measure-explicit MAC curves
Since the ﬁrsts proposals by Jackson (1991), Rubin et al. (1992) and Stoft (1995), measure-explicit
MACCs have been used to characterize available options to mitigate GHG emissions (or to save energy) in
terms of their abatement potential (respectively energy saving potential) and abatement cost. More recently,
McKinsey and Company have published measure-explicit MACCs assessing potentials in 2030 at the global
scale (McKinsey and Company, 2009). The World Bank has assessed reduction potentials of many countries
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in the form of MACCs (e.g., Johnson et al. (2009)). Also, Sweeney and Weyant (2008) have proposed a
MACC for California in 2020.2
Recent research has identiﬁed  and proposed solutions for  methodological issues when building
measure-explicit MAC curves; this has allowed to enhance the reporting of abatement costs and potentials.
A ﬁrst issue relates to uncertainty when assessing future costs. It is commonly addressed by presenting ranges
of costs and potentials instead of just two ﬁgures (IPCC, 2007, SPM6 p.11). A second issue comes from the
interaction between diﬀerent measures (e.g, promoting electric vehicles and green electricity together would
allow to save more GHG than the sum of the two isolated abatement measures). This can be tackled by
using integrated models to build the MACCs (Kesicki, 2012b). Also, future abatement costs at a given date
(e.g. 2030) will depend on previous eﬀorts to reduce GHG emissions, and on expectations about the future
price of carbon. Kesicki (2012a) studies this question by testing diﬀerent abatement pathways, along with
diﬀerences in social and private discount rates. Other issues are more diﬃcult to address, like the fact that
MACCs neglect non-climate beneﬁts  such as air pollution reduction or increase in energy security , or
that they assess project or technological costs only, excluding institutional barriers, transaction costs and
non-monetary costs (Kesicki and Ekins, 2012).
Our contribution is an investigation of how the information presented in a MACC could be used to
decide which options to use  and in which order  to achieve a given abatement target. To do so, we
characterize each option by their inertia, in addition to their cost and abating potential.3
3. Model description
A social planner controls GHG abatements from an emission baseline, by spending money on a set
of options described by their cost and abatement potential. We do not incorporate more realistic but
complex dynamics, such as sectoral interactions, crowding-out eﬀect on investment, or learning-by-doing
(del Rio Gonzalez, 2008; Kalkuhl et al., 2012). Instead, we only extend the MACC with information on how
long it takes to implement each of the measures.
3.1. GHG emissions
There are N abatement options, indexed by i. The model is run on a period that goes from 2000 to 2050
with a time step, ∆t, of 0.25 years. At each time step t, emissions are computed from the baseline emissions
Ebase(t) and the abatement a(i, t) achieved with each measure i at time t.
E(t) = Ebase(t)−
N∑
i=1
a(i, t) (1)
We assume constant baseline emissions, that is Ebase(t) = 5 GtCO2/yr. The cumulative emissions M(t) are
then computed as the sum of emissions:
M(0) = 0 (2)
M(t) = E(t) ·∆t+M(t−∆t) (3)
2For a more comprehensive review of existing MACCs, see Kesicki (2012a).
3Note that time considerations are already included in the building process of the MACCs, and play an important role in
assessing both the potential and the cost of each options (Kesicki, 2012a). However, the resulting MACC does not report
any information on inertia, making it diﬃcult to build optimal strategies from MACCs only. One conclusion will be that this
information on time could be displayed along with information on costs and potentials nearby the MACCs to allow a debate
on optimal implementation schedules of the presented mitigation options using these extended MACCs.
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Cost Abatement potential Growth constraint Implementation time
c amax α amax/α
$/tCO2 MtCO2/yr MtCO2/yr
2 yr
Cheap 30 1 500 60 25
Deep 60 3 500 50 70
Table 1: Numerical assumptions
3.2. Potentials, costs and inertia
Abatements eﬀorts in each sector are subject to two restrictions. First, each measure i has a maximum
abating potential amax(i), expressed in avoided annual emissions, in MtCO2/yr. For instance, switching
to more eﬃcient thermal engines for passenger vehicles may save a fraction of GHG emissions associated
with private mobility, but not more. In MACCs, this potential is commonly represented by the width of the
rectangles (see Fig. 1).
a(i, t) ≤ amax(i) (4)
In the MACC, each measure i is qualiﬁed with a constant abatement cost c(i)  the heights in Fig. 1.
Here, we also assume that abatement costs are independent of cumulative abatements and time. Abatement
a(i, t) achieved thanks to measure i at time t has a cost I(i, t) which reads:
I(i, t) = a(i, t) · c(i) (5)
So far, the model could be calibrated with data from a MACC. We add an explicit representation of
economic inertia, in the form of a measure-speciﬁc constraint on implementation pace. A given amount of
abatement requires a non-negative amount of time for its implementation. This is modeled as a maximum
speed α(i), (in MtCO2/yr per year), assumed to be independent of the ﬁnancial cost of the option
4:
achievable abatements at time t directly depend on already achieved abatements at time t−∆t.
a(i, t) ≤ a(i, t−∆t) + α(i) ·∆t (6)
For simplicity, we assume that α(i) is constant and does not depend on the previously achieved abatements
nor current time step t.
This modeling diﬀers from the time-to-build à la Kydland and Prescott (1982). Time-to-build would
reﬂect the idea that there is an incompressible lag between investment decisions and actual abatements.
With time-to-build, an arbitrary large amount of abatement would require as much time to be implemented
as a small abatement (if achieved through the same measure). In our framework, in contrast, the required
time lag is proportional to the amount of abatement.
These costs in time may come from any bottleneck, such as (i) availability of skilled workers, (ii) avail-
ability of productive capacities, (iii) incompressible institutional requirements, or other factors such as
(iv) emissions embedded in long-lived capital. Issues (i) and (ii) could be overcome by training workers
or redirecting unemployed workers and unused capital; but training and redirecting are measures per se
and cannot be done overnight either. The issue of institutional or organizational delays is well documented
(World Bank, 2010). Reducing them is also a measure per se, and takes time. The last point is related
to capital vintages and turnover: if one sees emissions as embedded in capital (Davis et al., 2010), decar-
bonization cannot be faster than capital turnover, except by wasting valuable productive capital through
premature replacement (Lecocq et al., 1998).
The value of α for a given measure can be assessed from available data. For instance, if cars are typically
scrapped 12 years after they are manufactured, switching from conventional cars to plug-in hybrids would
4 Note that abatement is expressed in MtCO2/yr.
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take at least 12 years. Taking into account slow technological diﬀusion (Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2011)
 sales are not likely to switch overnight from 100% conventional cars to 100% plug-in hybrid cars , it
can take as long as 30 years (IEA, 2009a). This full implementation time Tf is linked to the abatement
potentials amax and the maximum speed α:
Tf (i) =
amax(i)
α(i)
(7)
3.3. Social planner objectives
The objective is to achieve a climate-related target while minimizing abatement costs. The social planner
minimizes C, the total present cost of abatements, discounted at rate ρ over the period:
C =
T∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
I(i, t)
(1 + ρ)t·∆t
(8)
Theoretically, the social planner could control GHG emissions in order to equalize the marginal costs
of mitigation and adaptation in a cost-beneﬁt approach. Because of uncertainty surrounding both climate
response to a change in GHG emissions and adaptation costs, and because decisions are made at national
instead of global scale, it is common to adopt a cost-eﬀectiveness approach (Ambrosi et al., 2003).
In our model, this can be done by constraining cumulative emissions M to remain below a given carbon
budget Mobj .
M(t) ≤Mobj (9)
Cumulative emissions over a long period can be used as proxies for climate change (Matthews et al.,
2009). In practice, however, governments and other public agencies frequently provide objectives for given
points in time. For instance, the EU has the objective of cutting its emissions by 20 % of 1990 levels by
2020.5
In our model, these objectives can be implemented by deﬁning a set of milestones indexed by m, and by
constraining emissions at each milestone:
E(tm) ≤ Eobjm (10)
3.4. Numerical values
For illustrative purpose, we assume a MAC containing only two contrasted measures (N = 2), labeled
cheap and deep. Cheap has a lower abatement cost than deep, but also a lower abatement potential (see
Tab. 1 and Fig. 2). Cheap could represent for instance the measure of switching energy sources in buildings,
and deep could represent the retroﬁtting of these buildings. In the auto industry, cheap could represent the
energy eﬃciency gains in the internal combustion engines and deep switching to other energy sources, such
as electricity or biofuels.
In the absence of reliable data, we assume that it takes 70 years to implement the whole potential of deep,
while cheap only requires 25 years. Applying Eq. 7 gives values for α of respectively 50 MtCO2/yr
2 and
60 MtCO2/yr
2. We also use a discount rate ρ = 5%/yr. These values are not meant to represent accurately
concrete sectors of the economy, even though they do not diﬀer much from the two sectors modeled by
Lecocq et al. (1998). We use them to carry out illustrative experiments, which help draw more general
conclusions.
We solve this simple model using a linear programing algorithm provided by GAMS (Brook et al.,
1988). The source code also uses Scilab (Scilab Consortium, 2011). Code and data are available on the
corresponding author's web page.
5 It is also common to adopt intensity objectives, as the eﬃciency standards in the auto industry. Our model may be used
with existing intensity MACCs (IEA, 2009b, p. 37).
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Figure 2: The MACC used in our experiments. We ﬁnd that the long-term target of 3.75 GtCO2/yr should
not be achieved by implementing ﬁrst cheap and then deep. We also ﬁnd that a short-term abatement target of
750 MtCO2/yr should not be achieved implementing just cheap.
Figure 3: Left: Optimal abatement strategy to limit cumulative emissions below 175 GtCO2 between 2000 and 2050.
Because of inertia and discounting, deep has to enter before the potential of cheap has been exhausted. Right: curves
represent emissions in the baseline and in the constrained simulation; in-between areas represent the cumulative
abatement and the carbon budget in the constrained simulation.
4. Optimal implementation schedule to cope with a carbon budget
In this section, we investigate the optimal abatement pathway when using a carbon budget, i.e. with
full ﬂexibility on when to reduce emissions. This is implemented in our model by excluding Eq. 10, and
including Eq. 9. We then test a range of carbon budgets (Mobj), and assess the consequence on the optimal
reduction pathway.
4.1. Using expensive options before exhausting the potential of cheap ones
Figure 3 shows the optimal strategy for maintaining cumulative emission below 175 GtCO2 over the
2000-2050 period.6 This value is used for illustrative purpose, and will allow us to make some comparisons
with subsequent simulations (in Section 5).
6 Cumulative emissions in the baseline amount to 5 Gt/yr during 51 years, with a total of 255 Gt. The carbon budget thus
amounts to 69% of cumulative emisions.
6
Figure 4: Entry date and ceiling date of each abatement measure as a function of the carbon budget. "Start of
deep/cheap" is the date when the respective measure begins to be implemented; the ceiling date is the date when
the abating potential is exhausted.
The abatement paths (ﬁgure 3, left panel) have triangular or trapezoidal shapes; this shows that one of
the inertia (Eq. 6) or maximum potential (Eq. 4) constraint is always binding. The cumulative abatement
corresponds to the area between baseline emissions and emissions in the constrained run (ﬁgure 3, right
panel). In this case, the intuitive ranking of abatement measures is respected: the social planner starts by
implementing cheap before deep. However, she does not use the whole potential of cheap before starting
using deep. Deep enters in 2023 while cheap does not reach its full potential before 2027. A more stringent
objective would force deep to start even earlier (see below).
The optimal implementation strategy does not follow a merit order in which the whole potential of the
cheapest solutions is used before more expensive solutions are introduced.
A more systematic analysis using a range of carbon budgets (Fig. 4) conﬁrms that for any objective it is
never preferable to implement the expensive deep before cheap. It also shows that if the objective is stringent
enough (about 195 GtCO2), deep has to begin before the whole potential of cheap has been exploited 
the implementation is not sequential. And if the carbon budget is even more stringent (about 130 GtCO2),
deep is forced to start in 2000, at the same time as cheap.
4.2. Expensive options may be useful even when cheaper ones appear suﬃcient
Let us analyze a case in which the carbon budget is not very stringent, e.g. 210 GtCO2. This translates
into cumulative abatements of 45 GtCO2 over the period.
7 Cheap has a cumulative abatement potential of
more than 55 GtCO2.
8 It is then possible to achieve the abatement objective by implementing only cheap.
An intuitive strategy could be to focus on cheap and to not implement deep. Our simulation show that
this is not the optimal strategy, because there is a trade-oﬀ between (i) implementing only the cheapest
solutions, but starting early to give them enough time to reach the objective; (ii) delaying abatements in
order to save present value (thanks to the discounting), but undertaking both cheap and deep to be more
aggressive later and reach the objective in spite of the delayed action.
In our simulations (Fig. 4), the optimal strategy to meet a (lax) 210 GtCO2 carbon budget is to implement
deep from year 2040, which makes it possible not to implement cheap before 2011 (for a strategy starting in
2000). The additional cost of using deep is more than compensated by the delay on implementing cheap. In
7 Cumulative emissions in the baseline amount to 5 Gt/yr during 51 years, with a total of 255 Gt.
8 Its annual abatement potential is 1.5 Gt/yr and takes 25 years to implement in full (see Tab. 1); adding the cumulated
potential during the take-oﬀ phase (25 yr × 1.5 Gt/yr)/2 and the potential when annual abatements have reached their
maximum value 25 yr×1.5 Gt/yr gives a total of 56.25 Gt.
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other words, the optimal strategy uses an expensive measure even when a cheaper measure appears suﬃcient
to fulﬁll the objective.
Policymakers and the public should be informed of abatement potentials and costs, and MAC curves
provide this information. But they also need to be informed on the duration of the implementation process
of these measures. MACC providers could enhance their reporting with this information.
5. Optimal abatement pathways with emission targets
Commitments in terms of carbon budget are diﬃcult to enforce: there is an incentive for decision-makers
to delay investments and eﬀorts beyond their mandate. Alternative policies include the deﬁnition of emission
targets at one or several points in time. Short-term targets can be enforced with tradable emissions permits,
such as the EU ETS system. In the next two sections, we assume that commitments are made in terms of
abatement levels at diﬀerent points in time.
Cumulative-emissions constraint (Eq. 9) is thus excluded from the model, we include the emission con-
straint with a single milestone (m ∈ {1}, t1 = 2050) and we test various emission objectives (Eobj1 in
Eq. 10). In absence of inertia  i.e. an inﬁnite α in Eq. 6  the optimal response to an emission objective
would be to remain on the baseline emissions pathway from 2001 to 2049, and to implement abatement
options in 2050 only.9 We ﬁnd that with inertia  i.e., with a ﬁnite α in Eq. 6  the shape of the optimal
mitigation strategy depends on the stringency of the emission target.
5.1. Implementing expensive options before cheap ones
Figure 5 shows the optimal abatement pathway for achieving an ambitious reduction of 75% of emissions
in 2050. In this case, the optimal strategy is to start by implementing the most expensive option before the
cheapest (i.e., deep before cheap).
Indeed, the emission objective translates into abatements by 3.75 GtCO2/yr in 2050, which cannot be
achieved by implementing cheap alone. The cheapest way to achieve this objective in 2050 is to use cheap
to abate as much GHG emissions as possible, i.e. 1.5 GtCO2/yr. Because cheap cannot penetrate faster
than 60 MtCO2/yr
2, it has to enter in 2026. Then 2.25 GtCO2/yr remain to be abated with deep by 2050.
To do so, deep has to enter as soon as 2006, 20 years before cheap.
The 75% reduction in emissions leads to cumulative emissions of 175 GtCO2, and is thus comparable to
the simulation proposed in Section 4.1.10 Compared to the carbon budget simulation (CB), this simulation
with emission targets (ET) leads to start cheap later and deep sooner. Short-term abatements are lower 
in 2020, they amount to 750 MtCO2/yr in ET, against 1.3 GtCO2/yr in CB  but long-term abatements
are higher.
The loss of when-ﬂexibility eventually raises the present cost of abatements, from 390 G$ in the CB case
to 630 G$ in the ET simulation for the same ﬁnal cumulative emissions.11 This illustrates the fact that,
compared to emission objectives, carbon budgets with full when-ﬂexibility allow the social planner to reach
the same climate target at lower cost.
A more systematic analysis is presented in Fig. 6. It gives the optimal entry dates of both measures
(cheap and deep), as a function of the 2050 emission target. It shows that below a threshold emission target,
the optimal strategy starts to implement the expensive, inert and high abating potential measure before
the cheap one. In our example, this happens when the emission target is lower than 2.25 GtCO2/yr  i.e.
when the abatement objective is higher than 2.75 GtCO2/yr.
9 One could say that this would be done by starting with the cheapest measure and continuing with the more expensive
one until the emission objective is achieved. In this context, however, the terms starting and continuing would not have
a chronological meaning, as the abatement measures would both be implemented in 2050. Instead, those words would denote
the fact that the social planner, while designing the optimal strategy, would ﬁrst consider to implement cheap and then to
implement deep.
10 Since cumulative emissions are good proxies for climate change, both simulations would lead to comparable climate change
impacts.
11 In other words, 390 G$ is the lowest possible cost to reach the carbon budget constraint, while 630G$ is the lowest cost
for reaching the same carbon budget through one aggregate emission target in 2050.
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Figure 5: Optimal abatement pathways to achieve ambitious abatements (3.75 GtCO2/yr) in 2050. The expensive
option with large abatement potential is implemented before the cheaper option.
Figure 6: Entry date of each measure as a function of emission objective for 2050. For ambitious emission targets
(below 2.25 GtCO2/yr), the expensive option with large abatement potential is implemented before the cheaper
option.
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a. Short-term and Long-term objs. b. Short-term Only
Figure 7: Comparison of optimal abatement strategies to reach the same target for 2020, taking into account or
disregarding the longer-term 2050 objective (respectively S&L and SO). With an ambitious long-term target, the
short-term strategy is based on the more expensive option with higher abatement potential, not on the cheapest
option.
The fact that, with emission targets, expensive options may have to be implemented before cheap ones
illustrates that, in presence of inertia, marginal abatement costs should not necessarily be equal across sectors
(Vogt-Schilb et al., 2012). It also poses a practical problem. Considering the diﬃculty in creating a credible
long-term signal for the price of carbon  and in government ability to commit in general (Kydland and
Prescott, 1977; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003), economic actors cannot rely on long-term prices. If actors
consider only the current carbon price, then a carbon price of 60 $/tCO2 would be necessary to trigger
the entry of deep (see Tab.1). Fig. 5 shows that this measure should be implemented as early as 2005 to
reach the stringent objective (emissions of 750 MtCO2/yr in 2050) at the lowest possible cost. But this
high carbon price would also trigger the implementation of cheap (because its abatement cost, 30 $/tCO2,
is lower than the signal) in 2005, i.e. too soon, leading to a suboptimal abatement pathway.
5.2. The inﬂuence of long-term objectives on short-term strategies
Actual policies include shorter-term emission objectives, such as the EU target to abate emissions by 20%
or 30% in 2020. Short-term targets are a priori relevant because there is visibility over the short term on
technology availability, macroeconomics trends and institutional frameworks. But they are only a milestone
toward a more ambitious climate target in the long run, as the -75% by 2050 objective in Europe.
In this section, we ﬁnd that it is dangerous to use only information on costs and abating potential to
decide which measures to implement in order to achieve the intermediate target, because it can make the
long term target impossible to reach.
We compare two simulations. The ﬁrst simulation, labeled SO (Short-term Only), has a short-term
constraint for 2020, but no long-term constraint:
Eobj1 = E(2020) = 4.25 GtCO2/yr (11)
The second simulation, S&L (Short-term and Long-term objectives), has the same short-term target for
2020, and a longer-term constraint: a reduction by 75% of GHG emissions in 2050. In this simulation, there
are thus two emission milestones (see Eq. 10):
Eobj2 = E(2050) = 1.25 GtCO2/yr (12)
Eobj1 = E(2020) = 4.25 GtCO2/yr (13)
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Our objective is to assess the diﬀerence over the short-term between a strategy aiming at a short-term
target and a strategy aiming at both short-term and long-term targets. We ﬁnd that long-term objectives
impact strongly the short-term strategy.
Figure 7 compares the optimal abatement strategies from 2000 to 2020 in the two cases. With both
the 2020 and the 2050 objectives (simulation S&L, panel a.), the social planner starts by implementing
deep in 2006, and does not implement cheap before 2020 (as in Section 5.1). In contrast, when the 2050
milestone is disregarded (simulation SO, panel b.), the social planner starts abating later (in 2010 vs 2006)
and uses cheaper and lower-potential options, namely cheap and deep instead of deep only. The discounted
expenditures in abatement measures amounts to 28 G$ against 112 G$ when the 2050 objective is taken into
account: the optimal short-term ﬁnancial eﬀort is much higher if the long-term target is taken into account,
even though the abatement in MtCO2 is the same.
If the 2050 target is not taken into account before 2020, it may then appear extremely costly or even
impossible to achieve. In this illustrative example, the 75% reduction in emissions becomes indeed impossible
to achieve in 2050 in this case.12
Despite short-term aggregate emissions being abated to the same level in SO as in S&L by 2020, the
Short-term Only (SO) strategy produces a lock-in in a carbon intensive pathway that cannot be reversed
in the second period. In other words, the optimal strategy to reach the 2020 target is diﬀerent (it uses
more expensive options) if the 2050 objective is included in the optimization. With an ambitious long-term
objective, the short-term target needs to be achieved implementing the options with the largest potentials
and the greatest inertia, not with the cheapest solutions.
6. Conclusion
This paper investigates the use of measure-explicit MAC curves to design optimal abatement strategies
taking inertia into account. Inertia is modeled as a maximum amount of abatement that can be achieved
over a given period of time with a given measure from a MACC. This maximum implementation speed
complements the cost and abating potential already provided by existing MACCs. It has a large inﬂuence
on the optimal schedule of the various abatement measures.
In particular, optimal abatement strategies may (i) implement expensive options before the whole po-
tential of cheaper measures has been exploited; (ii) use expensive options even when cheap ones appear
suﬃcient to meet the climate target; or (iii) start to implement expensive options before cheap ones. If
the climate objective is stringent and their inertia is large enough, the optimal strategy would be to start
implementing at the same time a set of measures covering a wide range of abatement costs.
These results conﬁrm the need to account for speciﬁc inertia when designing climate policies. Transform-
ing climate objectives into emissions pathways cannot be done with aggregate models if perfect foresight
and long-term policy credibility are not assumed. Without these assumptions, emissions pathway need to
be multi-sectoral, distinguishing in particular heterogeneous capital turnovers (Lecocq et al., 1998; Jaccard
and Rivers, 2007; Vogt-Schilb et al., 2012).
This has some implication for current mitigation policies. In the European Union, there is currently
a debate on whether aggregate GHG emissions should be abated by 20% or 30% in the short-term (i.e.
2020). This question on when to abate GHG emissions cannot be separated from the question on how
these abatements have to be done (i.e., in which sector and with which measures). Economic actors might
otherwise focus on cheap and fast-to-implement solutions to reach the short-term target, neglecting high-
potential but high-inertia options which may be required to meet an ambitious objective in 2050. For this
reason, the optimal approach to achieve a given abatement target at one point in time may not be to set a
carbon price and introduce all the abatement options that show an abatement cost below this carbon price.
It may be preferable to use additional policies, targeted at high-potential but long-to-implement options,
such as urban planing or deployment of low-carbon technologies.
12 Cheap has entered in 2006. It would reach its full potential (1.5 Gt/yr) in 2030. If deep enters in 2021, it would also reach
abatements of 1.5 Gt/yr in 2050, 30 years after (30 yr × 50 MtCO2/yr). The total would be abatements of 3 Gt/yr in 2050,
when the target is 3.75 Gt/yr.
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There is of course a balance to maintain (Azar and Sandén, 2011): sectoral policies should be targeted
enough to distinguish diﬀerences in inertia, but broad enough to let economic agents select the best options
and technologies to reach them (this is for instance the case of existing fuel economy standards in the
auto industry). Because of information asymmetry and the risk of rent-seeking behavior, micro-managing
mitigation by deﬁning over-targeted objectives can be counter-productive (Laﬀont, 1999). Also, objectives
need to be updated when new information is available (Rodrik, 2008); for instance if one measure turns
out to be more expensive, or turns out to save less GHG, than expected. Finally, if these sectoral policies
overlap, they may come with additional costs that should be analyzed carefully (Braathen, 2007; Böhringer
and Rosendahl, 2010; Fischer and Preonas, 2010) and taken into account.
Our results are still theoretical, based on illustrative examples. We propose that MAC providers enhance
their reporting to the decision-makers and the public, supplying also an assessment of the implementation
speed of each option. With this information, the simple model proposed in this paper could be used to
assess the optimal implementation schedule of the various existing abating options. Short-term sectoral or
technological targets (e.g for 2020 or 2030) could then be derived from these pathways. This process would
provide ﬁgures to debate new or existing sectoral policies, such as the objective of 20% of renewable energies
in 2020, the fuel economy standards in the auto industry, or proposed changes in land-use planning, building
norms and infrastructure design.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Nils Axel Braathen, Marianne Fay, Michael Grubb, Jean Charles Hourcade,
Fabian Kesicki, Camille Mazas, Guy Meunier, Julie Rozenberg, the audiences at the International Energy
Workshop (2012), at the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Conference
(2012), at the International Association of Energy Economics (2012) and at the CIRED seminar who provided
useful comments. We also thank Patrice Dumas for technical support. The remaining errors are entirely
the authors'.
The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily
reﬂect the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.
References
Ambrosi, P., Hourcade, J., Hallegatte, S., Lecocq, F., Dumas, P., Ha Duong, M., 2003. Optimal control models and elicitation
of attitudes towards climate damages. Environmental Modeling and Assessment 8 (3), 133147.
Azar, C., Sandén, B. A., 2011. The elusive quest for technology-neutral policies. Environmental Innovation and Societal
Transitions 1 (1), 135139.
Böhringer, C., Rosendahl, K. E., 2010. Green promotes the dirtiest: on the interaction between black and green quotas in
energy markets. Journal of Regulatory Economics 37 (3), 316325.
Braathen, N. A., 2007. Instrument mixes for environmental policy: How many stones should be used to kill a bird? International
Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 1 (2), 185235.
Brook, A., Kendrick, D., Meeraus, A., 1988. GAMS, a user's guide. SIGNUM Newsl. 23 (3-4), 1011, ACM ID: 58863.
Davis, S. J., Caldeira, K., Matthews, H. D., 2010. Future CO2 emissions and climate change from existing energy infrastructure.
Science 329 (5997), 1330 1333.
del Rio Gonzalez, P., 2008. Policy implications of potential conﬂicts between short-term and long-term eﬃciency in CO2
emissions abatement. Ecological Economics 65 (2), 292303.
Dixit, A., Lambertini, L., 2003. Interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and ﬁscal policies. The American
Economic Review 93 (5), pp. 15221542.
Fischer, C., Preonas, L., 2010. Combining policies for renewable energy: Is the whole less than the sum of its parts? International
Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 4, 5192.
Guivarch, C., Hallegatte, S., 2011. Existing infrastructure and the 2C target. Climatic Change 109 (3-4), 801805.
Gusdorf, F., Hallegatte, S., Lahellec, A., 2008. Time and space matter: How urban transitions create inequality. Global
Environmental Change 18 (4), 708719.
IEA, 2009a. Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Tech. rep., OECD/International Energy Agency, Paris, France.
IEA, 2009b. Transport Energy and CO2 : Moving towards Sustainability. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment Paris, France.
IPCC, 2007. Summary for policymakers. In: Climate change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth
assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New
York, USA.
12
Jaccard, M., Rivers, N., 2007. Heterogeneous capital stocks and the optimal timing for CO2 abatement. Resource and Energy
Economics 29 (1), 116.
Jackson, T., 1991. Least-cost greenhouse planning supply curves for global warming abatement. Energy Policy 19 (1), 3546.
Johnson, T. M., Alatorre, C., Romo, Z., Liu, F., 2009. Low-Carbon development for mexico. Tech. rep.
Kalkuhl, M., Edenhofer, O., Lessmann, K., 2012. Learning or lock-in: Optimal technology policies to support mitigation.
Resource and Energy Economics 34, 123.
Kesicki, F., 2012a. Intertemporal issues and marginal abatement costs in the UK transport sector. Transportation Research
Part D: Transport and Environment 17 (5), 418426.
Kesicki, F., 2012b. Marginal abatement cost curves: Combining energy system modelling and decomposition analysis. Envi-
ronmental Modeling & Assessment.
Kesicki, F., Ekins, P., 2012. Marginal abatement cost curves: a call for caution. Climate Policy 12 (2), 219236.
Klepper, G., Peterson, S., 2006. Marginal abatement cost curves in general equilibrium: The inﬂuence of world energy prices.
Resource and Energy Economics 28 (1), 123.
Kydland, F. E., Prescott, E. C., 1977. Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political
Economy 85 (3), pp. 473492.
Kydland, F. E., Prescott, E. C., 1982. Time to build and aggregate ﬂuctuations. Econometrica 50 (6), 13451370.
Laﬀont, J.-J., 1999. Political economy, information, and incentives. European Economic Review 43, 649669.
Lecocq, F., Hourcade, J., Ha Duong, M., 1998. Decision making under uncertainty and inertia constraints: sectoral implications
of the when ﬂexibility. Energy Economics 20 (5-6), 539555.
Matthews, H. D., Gillett, N. P., Stott, P. A., Zickfeld, K., 2009. The proportionality of global warming to cumulative carbon
emissions. Nature 459 (7248), 829832.
McKinsey, Company, 2009. Pathways to a low-carbon economy: Version 2 og the global greenhouse gas abatement cost curve.
executive summary. Tech. rep.
Rodrik, D., 2008. Normalizing industrial policy. Commission for Growth and Development. Working Paper 3, World Bank.
Rubin, E. S., Cooper, R. N., Frosch, R. A., Lee, T. H., Marland, G., Rosenfeld, A. H., Stine, D. D., 1992. Realistic mitigation
options for global warming. Science 257 (5067), 148149.
Scilab Consortium, 2011. Scilab: The free software for numerical computation. Scilab Consortium, Paris, France.
Stoft, S. E., 1995. The economics of Conserved-Energy "Supply" curves. The Energy Journal 16 (4), 109140.
Sweeney, J., Weyant, J., 2008. Analysis of measures to meet the requirements of california's assembly bill 32. Tech. rep.,
Stanford University.
Vogt-Schilb, A., Meunier, G., Hallegatte, S., 2012. How inertia and limited potentials aﬀect the timing of sectoral abatements
in optimal climate policy. Policy Research Working Paper 6154, World Bank, Washington DC, USA.
World Bank, 2010. Doing Business 2011. World Bank, Washington DC.
13
